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JUST COMPENSATION AND JUST POLITICS
Saul Levmore*
Perhaps no area of law is as well-known and as little understood as
takings law. Most citizens know that when the government takes a
piece of property it must compensate the previous owner, but only law-
yers know the extent to which courts have struggled with the question
of regulatory takings, or what to do when government actions burden,
rather than completely displace, property owners. In this article, I ex-
plore some of the mysteries of takings law, and I develop both a posi-
tive theory about some of its rules and a normative argument about
modern interest group politics.
I. BURDENS AND BENEFITS
Consider, first, an issue that is seemingly far removed from any
cases or statutes that we study as the law-the puzzle of the location
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and nature of the dividing line between politics and markets. Govern-
mental projects often include some actions that involve market partici-
pation of the familiar private sort, some that involve the power of the
state to take private property while compensating for its pre-taking
value,' some that draw on powers of the state, such as the police and
taxing powers, to burden without compensation, and some that might
best be described as treating some citizens more generously than others
through a process we call politics. Thus, a decision to build new mis-
siles may involve contracts for the production of these armaments that
resemble purely private procurement contracts, and it may require the
use of the condemnation power (combined with the obligation to com-
pensate condemnees) to acquire land on which these missiles will be
placed. It will almost surely draw on the familiar taxing power for fi-
nancing. And it may make use of the police or some other power when
it burdens neighbors of the new missile sites whose properties may drop
in value as a result of the increased traffic on the nearby government
land or of the perceived danger of living near a military installation.
Finally, although the major contracts entered into for the production of
these missiles may be negotiated at arm's length, there are substantial
economic benefits that may "spill over" to noncontracting parties. As
such, the decision to award the contracts to some manufacturers, rather
than to others, and the larger decision concerning the number of mis-
siles to be built or, indeed, whether to build these missiles at all, is
normally influenced by the elected representatives of the localities that
expect positive spillovers from these contracts.
In short, governmental decisions generate burdens and benefits,
some of which are compensated and some of which are not. Can any-
thing be said that is descriptively useful or normatively defensible, ei-
ther about when the government pays for the burdens it imposes or
when the government is itself paid for the benefits it bestows? The
traditional answer is that the government may always (subject only to
the gentlest judicial review for arbitrariness) impose taxes or user fees
through the appropriate legislative or other process, 2 that it must al-
l. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943) ("The owners ought not to gain
by speculating on probable increase in value due to the Government's activities."); Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) ("[V]alue to be ascertained does not include, and the owner is
not entitled to compensation for any element resulting subsequently to or because of the taking.").
2. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318-20 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing possibil.
ity that a "regulatory" tax will be invalid but noting that the Court's modern interpretation of the
commerce clause reduces the likelihood that even a regulatory tax would be struck down); Bittker,
Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 3 (1987)
[Vol, 22:285
HeinOnline  -- 22 Conn. L. Rev. 286 1989-1990
JUST COMPENSATION AND JUST POLITICS
ways pay fair compensation when it physically takes or invades private
property,3 and that the law regarding compensation for "regulatory"
decisions that reduce the value of private property is a mess.' By and
large, the government can impose serious burdens without compensat-
ing citizens, such as those who must suddenly listen to highway noise or
those who find their property values dropping as a result of zoning deci-
sions, because courts will find that there was no taking of property, but
rather the mere exercise of police power,5 often in the interests of
health and safety,' or of emergency power,7 or of the simple power to
(no limits on income taxation). For a modern example of the Court's willingness to allow a tax
that is not evenhanded across states, see United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) (uphold-
ing exemption of Alaskan oil from windfall profits tax on account of the difficulty of its
extraction).
3. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 603 ("[Court's] obsession with permanent physical invasions of
even the most de minimus variety borders on fetishism.").
4. On this, there is wide agreement. See. e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairnmes' require that economic injuries caused by pub-
lic action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons."); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County In Perspective: Thirty Years of Su-
preme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 63 ("a crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme
Court doctrine on the law of expropriation"); Sax, Takings. Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE LJ. 149, 149 (1971) ("Few legal problems have proved as resistant to analytical efforts
as that posed by the Constitution's requirement that private property not be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation.").
There is reason to think that recent decisions have exacerbated the problem. See. e.g., Ep-
stein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. I (describing ways in which recent
decisions will generate vexing litigation).
5. A classic statement of this justification is in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), where
the Court said, "And where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the
property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property." Id. at 279-80; see
also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding zoning regulations as exercises of
city's police power to protect residents from the ill effects of urbanization); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinance must find its justification in some
aspect of police power).
6. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance regulating
dredging and pit excavation as a safety measure held not to be a taking); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City
of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 500 (1919) ("The power [of a state to prohibit the sale of dangerous
chemicals] is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health
and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good."); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915) (regulation of livery stable upheld as within the range of state's power to legislate
for the health and general welfare).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("War
. . . demands the strict regulation of nearly all resources. . . . [Its] economic restrictions, tempo-
rary in character, are insignificant when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life
and freedom of action which war traditionally demands."); infra text accompanying notes 76-78
1990]
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be rid of "noxious uses," 8 or that the burdens were only consequentia
or pecuniary 0 or the product of "change" '11 or sufficiently minor so as
not to deny a reasonable rate of return to private investors.12 But even
if one avoids the variety among state constitutions and state courts and
limits the generalizations to federal law,13 there are numerous excep-
tions and constraints, along with a cottage industry of commentary on
the seemingly inconsistent results in each area of government interven-
tion. As such, the safe answer to the question of when the government
must 14 compensate for the burdens it imposes is to say "always" when
(discussing city's use of its "emergency powers" in time of financial difficulty to declare morato-
rium on redemption of bonds).
8. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
9. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S.
341 (1925); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923) ("The conclusion
to be drawn from these and other cases which might be cited is, that for consequential loss or
injury resulting from lawful governmental action, the law affords no remedy."). The "consequen-
tial" label is, of course, an ambiguous one.
10. See. e.g., Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923) (injury to business
carried out on taken land generally not an element of just compensation); A.G. Davis Ice Co. v.
United States, 362 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1966) (evidence of lost profits too speculative or remote to
be counted in condemnation proceeding).
11. See. e.g., Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 486 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The Fifth Amendment
does not insulate homeowners from bearing the costs of urban change.").
12. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980) ("[Tjhe appellants are
free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a development plan to local
officials. Thus, it cannot be said that the impact of general land-use regulations has denied appel-
lants the 'justice and fairness' guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (Penn Central able to obtain a
"reasonable return" on its investment).
13. The just compensation requirement is, of course, applicable to the states. See Chicago, B.
& Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). State constitutional provisions are sometimes written
or interpreted so that compensation is more generous to property owners affected by governmental
actions. Forty-seven state constitutions expressly provide for compensation when land is taken (the
remaining three-Kansas, North Carolina, and Virginia-have been judicially interpreted to do
the same), and twenty-six require compensation when property is "damaged." R. CUNNINOIAM,
W. STOEBtUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 510-11 n.4 (1984); Guy, Land Condem-
nation A Comparative Survey of North Dakota Statutory Law, 51 N.D.L. REV. 387 (1974)
(comparing constitutions, statutes, and judicial procedures); Comment, Rethinking Regulatory
Takings: A View Toward a Comprehensive Analysis, 8 N. ILL. U. REV. 113, 113 n.2 (1987)
(reporting variety in state constitutions). Although most of the arguments in this article, and in
the larger positive theory of which this is a part, apply as well to state constitutional law, I will for
the most part limit the discussion and the evidence to federal decisions and to federal politics.
14. It is also interesting to ask when the government chooses to compensate those who are
burdened by its actions, even though courts would not have required it to do so. See, e.g.,
Hagman, Compensable Regulation, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOuTS 256, 266-67 (D. Hagman & D.
Misczynski eds. 1978) (discussing several examples of legislated compensation, in excess of that
required by contemporary courts, such as that called for in the Highway Beautification Act, which
[Vol. 22:285
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it physically takes property,15 and is not to respond otherwise. If one
must guess as to the result in these cases of regulatory takings, the
received wisdom is, first, to complain that the Supreme Court has cre-
ated an area of law that is chaotic at best, and then to say that com-
pensation is not normally required, but that it is more likely to be so
compelled the more the government's actions affect "traditional prop-
erty rights" and the more they reduce the value of the property in
question down close to zero. 6
Although the question of when the government must pay for the
burdens it imposes is one of the most familiar topics in the legal litera-
ture, the question of when and how the government extracts payments
from localities and other minorities it benefits is virtually ignored.17
One can hardly question a majoritarian government's legal power to
require payments. In the first place, the government need not do much
at all, and it may be able to wait until the minority expresses a willing-
ness to pay for benefits with one currency or another. And a clever
government has many ways of raising revenue from all citizens while
distributing benefits to favored constituents and denying similar bene-
fits to citizens who are not part of the governing coalition.,' But more
generally, the government can choose to finance some projects out of
general taxes or borrowing while it decides that others should be paid
for either through user fees, through specific taxes that fall roughly on
those who enjoy a given set of projects, or through "special assess-
ments" levied on those who (sometimes roughly and sometimes quite
required removal of outdoor advertising signs and promised that federal government would pay
75 % of the cost of compensation with states paying the remainder, states trying to terminate signs
under the police power, without compensation, violate the act and lose 10% of their entire high-
way aid). For the most part, this is not something explored directly in this article.
15. See supra note 3.
16. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 592-604; Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A
Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L REv. 465 (1983) (criticizing Court's focus
on tangible aspects of real property); Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUbt. L REv, 1600 (1988)
(describing Court as increasingly formalistic in trying to reconcile inherent conflict between prop-
erty and democracy).
17. Broadly speaking, there is an enormous literature on this subject, much of it arising out of
J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). But at the level of real law,
where the question is how much could be extracted out of some groups, and with what means,
there is very little written. In the area of takings law, there is one well-known strand of work on
expanding the tradition of special assessments, discussed below, in order to finance payments to
those who are burdened by governmental actions by collecting from those who benefit. See gener-
ally WINDFALLS FOR WIPEoTrrs, supra note 14.
18. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRcATIcE 127-28
(3d ed. 1980).
1990]
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precisely) will benefit from the specific project at issue. Thus, we find
some roads and bridges paid for out of general revenues, some under-
written with tolls collected from actual users, many financed through
taxes on motor vehicle fuels so that motorists 9 in general pay for roads
in a way that only roughly corresponds with marginal (or other)
costs,20 and a very few funded by the owners of property adjacent to
these roads through special assessments. A safe answer to the question
of how a majoritarian government may raise money to build or main-
tain roads and other projects is to say that it has many options and that
it can do pretty much as it pleases, subject only to familiar, distant
constraints, such as those that bar obvious discrimination against inter-
state commerce and against groups that might successfully raise equal
protection claims.21
But the more difficult question is not when governments may ex-
tract payments for the benefits they provide, but rather when govern-
ments, in fact, do extract payments from those who specifically benefit
from governmental actions. The only thing that can easily be said
about this question is that governments could use special assessments
and user fees more than they currently do, but little is known about
why and when these devices are used. 2
19. 1 do not mean to insist that the true incidence of these or other taxes is an easy matter to
analyze. Thus, fuel taxes may be passed through by truckers to those who consume the products
transported on the highways. On the other hand, the higher shipping costs may stimulate substitu-
tion to more locally grown or manufactured goods, so that the real incidence of the original fuel
tax is divided between consumers and some producers in an unknown way.
20. Fuel taxes (when used to finance road construction and maintenance) are perhaps the very
best example of indirect user fees. Still, inasmuch as some roads are enormously more expensive to
build than others, there must be a fair amount of cross-subsidization from some motorists to
others. The winners are those who drive (or purchase goods that are shipped across) relatively few
miles over expensive (mountainous, perhaps) roads. See R. MUSORAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 197 (1973).
21. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax as
causing invidious discrimination that runs afoul of the equal protection clause); Hellerstein, State
Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudica-
tion?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426 (1977); Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention,
69 VA. L. REV. 563, 592-604 (1983).
22. User fees are occasionally employed to raise funds for highways (toll roads), museums,
parks, airports, courts, and a variety of other projects managed by governments. It is difficult,
however, to generalize about why some of these charges are more popular in some jurisdictions
than in others, and there are obviously many more areas where charges could be assessed. Unfor-
tunately, there is little theoretical or empirical work on the subject and its possibilities. See gener-
ally TAX FOUND., SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND SERVICE CHARGES IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE (1970);
Goetz, The Revenue Potential of User-Related Charges in State and Local Governments, in
BROAD BASED TAXES 113 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973) (noting that, aside from charges related to
higher education and roads, user fees are not of great quantitative importance and that the de-
[Vol. 22:285
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In setting up these problems, I have alluded to the relationship
between, or even to the symmetry of, these questions of revenue raising
and of takings law. Perhaps the most straightforward way of expressing
the connection between the topics is to think first of a framework in
which politics and markets are regarded as entirely separate arenas.
The fifth amendment23 can then be understood as providing that there
are at least some actions, decided in the political arena, that must be
carried out in a way that imitates the market. Condemnees entitled to
compensation will, after all, receive value as it can best be deduced
from previous or similar market transactions. One might say, in eco-
nomic terms, that the government, a political entity, is forced to enter
the market arena and purchase (certain) rights, but that, because its
intentions can rarely be kept secret and because there are likely to be
holdouts, the government may take, rather than bargain, if it pays a
price that resembles that which would have been paid in a more ideal
market, or bargaining, situation."' For the present, it is sufficient to say
that potential inefficiencies and abuses of the political process are
averted by precommitting (otherwise political actors) to the market.
Analogously, when a government project is financed through user fees,
special assessments, and other means that charge beneficiaries, rather
than citizens at large, one might again say that markets are substituted
for politics. If the government were committed both to a broad view of
takings law, so that it paid for many of the burdens it imposed, and to
the regular use of user fees and special assessments, rather than to a
broad tax base, then the government might be seen as operating under
rules that were conceptually consistent. In such a case, majoritarian
politics would consistently be checked by mirketplace bargains. Citi-
zens in such a society would be wary of lobbying for projects they did
not wish to pay for, and, in this sense, politics would resemble markets.
ductibility of local taxes and not of user charges may have much to do with the small role played
by these charges).
23. The relevant part of the amendment reads: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
24. R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAWv 49 (3d ed. 1986).
A good economic argument for eminent domain, although one with greater application to
railroads and other right-of-way companies than to the government, is that it is necessary
to prevent monopoly. Once the railroad or pipeline has begun to build its line, the cost of
abandoning it for an alternative route becomes very high. Knowing this, people owning
land in the path of the advancing line will be tempted to hold out for a very high
price-a price in excess of the opportunity cost of the land.
1990]
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This relationship between the law of governmentally imposed bur-
dens and that of governmentally provided benefits suggests that every
theory of takings law should explain or at least struggle with the ques-
tion of why the power to tax-without compensation, of course-is not
fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional obligation to com-
pensate condemnees. If, however, a given tax were a good deal (even on
average25), so that, in return for the tax paid, one received benefits of
equal or greater value, there would be nothing to explain. Takings law
itself never requires like-kind exchanges, it simply requires the taker, in
some instances, to return equal value. Specially assessed taxes (on ben-
eficiaries) and, certainly, user fees can, thus, be described as takings
(of money) that are coordinated with compensatory payments (in the
form of services or other benefits). 28 Broadly based taxes that are used
to finance a range of projects, however, do not pretend to strike fair
bargains with all taxpayers, but, instead, benefit some citizens and bur-
den others. Thus, it seems sensible to wonder whether there is not some
correlation between the degree to which compensation is required and
the extent to which broader taxes are disfavored. In short, a system
that strongly protected individual property rights would require com-
pensation when an individual's property was burdened for the public
good and would also minimize the use of broadly based taxes, which
also threaten to benefit some citizens at the expense of others.
Needless to say, the consistency just sketched between burdens
and benefits, or takings and broad taxes, is not one that is much in
evidence in the politics and markets we know. Our legal system might
25. We do not, after all, generally compensate for idiosyncratic tastes or values so that it may
be enough if benefits on average, or at least roughly, matched up against costs, or taxes. See
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 ("[It] would seem that there may be other cases
beside the every day one of taxation, in which the share of each party in the benefit of a scheme of
mutual protection is sufficient compensation for the correlative burden that it is compelled to
assume."), opinion amended, 219 U.S. 575 (1911).
26. Indeed, the more general theory of takings law, alluded to in this article, makes use of this
idea that the ability of governments to identify beneficiaries and to assess user fees is relevant to
understanding the judicial decisions in this area. On the traditional and sensible notion that gov-
ernmental actions are not compensable takings because they are accompanied by the delivery of
in-kind benefits, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (denying com-
pensation where mine-owners were all required by statute to leave a pillar of supporting coal for
their mutual safety because the regulation "secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has
been recognized as a justification of various laws"); Epstein, supra note 4, at 5-23 (arguing con-
vincingly that the reciprocal advantage idea must be applied, as it was in Mahon, within the reach
of a single statutory scheme, and not used, as in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding limits on mining), as a general justification where the party
whose property was taken did not receive in-kind compensation in the same transaction).
[Vol, 22:285
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be described as requiring compensation for a "medium" amount of bur-
dens that the government imposes, but not requiring any significant
connection between taxpayers and beneficiaries of governmental
expenditures.
In the balance of this paper, I consider both the benefit and bur-
den sides of this formulation and show that we can learn something
about each from the other. In Part II, I emphasize that it is indeed
mysterious that in politics we do not resort more regularly to markets,
and I explore a number of reasons why this may be so. I suggest that as
a positive matter our legal system finds certain kinds of conflicts be-
tween political majorities and minorities more troubling than others.
And I will argue that as a normative matter we might be better off
injecting more explicit market transactions (of a novel kind) into polit-
ics, although professional politicians may not share my enthusiasm for
this kind of reform or experimentation. In Part III, I return to takings
law with the perspective offered by the positive analysis in Part II. I try
to show that a fair amount of takings law can be understood as reflect-
ing the particular concern I describe about the bargains and tensions
between majorities and minorities.
II. MARKETS AND POLITICS
A. Special Bids
Two closely related puzzles affect my argument. Consider, first, a
modestly surprising evolutionary development in tax policy. Govern-
ments tend to raise money through a variety of taxes, rather than
through one "best" tax.27 There are many explanations of this phenom-
enon, but I think the most important is that this shotgun approach
keeps down the marginal rate of any of the taxes.28 If, for instance,
income taxes or property taxes alone bore the entire brunt of govern-
mental budgets, then there would be serious lock-in effects on property,
because transfers would trigger income taxes, or severe incentives to
underinvest in improvements to property, and so forth. Virtually all
27. It is likely that each kind of tax brings with it new administrative costs; nevertheless, our
governments generally use some combination of property, sales. and income taxes in order to raise
the bulk of their revenue. Indeed, additional funds are raised through excise taxes, franchise taxes,
and other sources--each of which again adds administrative costs-but the simple point is that
governments rely on a multiplicity of taxes despite the transaction cost disadvantage of such a tax
policy.
28. There is reason to think that high marginal rates encourage inefficient substitutions away
from the consumption or production of that which is heavily taxed. As such, the best strategy
might be to tax many things lightly, despite the administrative costs associated with such a plan.
1990]
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taxes distort behavior, but, since higher taxes distort more than lower
taxes, it is probably sensible to have many lighter taxes, rather than
fewer, heavier levies.29
Is it, therefore, not odd that our government uses special assess-
ments less than it did in the past? There was a time, between twenty-
five and one hundred years ago, when a fair number of large public
projects were financed through intricate assessment mechanisms that
sought to collect more tax from those who benefited more from these
projects-and when it seemed as if the inevitable trend was toward
greater use of such assessments.30 Such assessments are hardly un-
known today (in the city in which I live, for instance, a sales tax was
levied on bills at restaurants within the city limits in order to help pay
for the subsidy given to assist in the construction of a downtown hotel,
which, in turn, was expected to help rejuvenate the business district
and draw tourists and small conventions), but they are a less important
part of fiscal policy than they were some time ago.3 1 This is odd be-
cause government spends and, therefore, taxes far more now than it did
when special assessments were more popular, and, to the extent that
much of our tax structure can be understood as employing many taxes
in order to keep down distortions (or complaints about historically high
rates), one would think that special assessments would be more popular
than ever. Such taxes, like user fees, would serve to keep down prop-
erty, sales, and income tax rates. It is possible, of course, that the ad-
ministrative costs associated with special assessments proved so great
that they were not worth the advantages they imparted with respect to
other taxes.
A related and far more complex problem concerns the virtual ab-
sence of assessments that I will call "special bids"-that is, assessments
voluntarily offered in return for government benefits.3 2 What puzzles
29. A more technical way of expressing this idea is to note that there is a tradeoff between
marginal rates and the number of different taxes and that the optimal mix probably does not
involve the corner solution of one high tax.
30. See NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS: A MEANS OF FINANCING MUNICI-
PAL IMPROVEMEN'S (3d ed. 1929) (detailing methods of calculation for a variety of projects); V.
ROSEWATER. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS: A STUDY IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE (2d ed. 1898).
31. For some historical material on municipal service charges, see TAX FOUND., supra note 22,
at 6-10 (from 1940 to 1960, charge revenues, such as collections from users of water and sewer
services, grew from 4.0 to 15.6% of municipalities' revenues from own sources).
32. Once we come to realize that special assessments must most often be voluntary-at least
in the sense that taxpayers probably have or had the option to call off the expenditure in question
(and, therefore, the assessments)-the difference between assessments that are "imposed" by gov-
ernments and bids that are offered by taxpayers largely disappears.
[Vol. 22:285
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me is that politics often generates winners and losers, while markets
have a more unlimited range of bargains. There is, therefore, a large
untapped middle ground in politics, where winners could have been
made to bargain and pay for a portion of their windfalls.
The puzzle that I have in mind is best described with one of the
many available modern examples. The National Academy of Science
studied proposals from many states for the construction of a supercon-
ducting supercollider, which, if completed, will be the largest and most
expensive scientific research tool in history. The Academy delivered a
"short list" of sites to the Department of Energy, from which the Sec-
retary then chose a location in Texas surrounding the town of Wax-
ahachie.33 The runners-up were said to have included Illinois (where
relevant facilities and personnel associated with Fermilab were already
in place), Tennessee, Michigan, Colorado, and North Carolina. ' Other
relevant facts include the point that at the time of the decision the
President-elect, the Speaker of the House, and the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee were all Texans-and that funding for the
project ultimately required not the decision of an academy or cabinet
secretary but congressional votes; that the Texas location would require
much less condemnation of private homes and other property; and that
geologic conditions at the Texas site may have been most favorable. 35
In any event, there was rejoicing in Texas, disappointment in Illinois,
and bitterness on the part of a number of politicians.3 6
The result is, in many ways, no different from many other political
decisions about government expenditures. There are winners who ap-
parently enjoy enormous windfalls, and there are losers who are ex-
cluded from these windfalls and who join the iest of us in financing the
various projects. Studies indicate that some states take in far more fed-
eral. money than they contribute to the federal government, while
others must obviously pay more in taxes than is spent in their jurisdic-
tions.37 There are obvious problems with these reported calculations, if
33. Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
34. Washington Post, Dec. 30, 1987, at A4, col. I (short list was composed of Texas, Arizona,
Colorado, Tennessee, New York, Illinois, Michigan, and North Carolina).
35. Lemonick, A Controversial Prize for Texas, TthE, Nov. 28, 1988, at 79; Washington Post.
supra note 33, at A14, col. 1.
36. See, e.g., Big D Harvests a Superior Plum, US. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 21,
1988, at 18 (quoting Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich.) as detecting "a strong smell of White
House politics"); Washington Post, supra note 33, at A14, col. I (Senator Alan Dixon (D-ll.)
"appalled" that "two days after the 1988 presidential election, the campaign continues").
37. The information that is readily available is interesting but difficult to interpret. There are
clearly states from which Internal Revenue collections vastly exceed the amount of federal funds
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only because not all federal expenditures are as desirable as others. But
no one pretends that it all balances out and that prosperity within every
state is completely unrelated either to the power wielded by its congres-
sional representatives or to the installations that historically happen to
be located within its boundaries. A larger Navy, for example, means
more jobs in Connecticut, where shipbuilding is a major industry, and
in Virginia, where naval bases and sailors spend their money, and we
have come to expect that the disposition of budgetary requests from the
Secretary of the Navy has something to do with the seniority and com-
mittee assignments of these two states' elected representatives.
Why did not the Illinois delegation, on the eve of its "defeat,"
announce that, should the Supercollider project be awarded to Illinois,
the state would pay the federal government two billion dollars, or some
other amount that is sufficiently large to have caused decisionmakers to
believe that, from the national perspective, Illinois offered a better deal
than Texas? Interested states did need to guarantee the availability of
electric power and water, and Texas is reported to have promised one
billion dollars to help pay the Supercollider's electric bills and building
costs, but Congress reportedly sought to avert a bidding war by ruling
distributed. Thus, for the most recent year of available data, about $1.5 billion was collected from
Alaska while $2.8 billion was spent there. The numbers are not comparable because the collec-
tions were in fiscal year 1988 while the distributions are for the year ending September 30, 1987,
but I think the numbers are fairly suggestive. Other seemingly fortunate states, on a per capita
basis, include New Mexico (the most fortunate), North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia, and
Utah. The unfortunate states appear to include Illinois and Michigan. Compare BUREAU OF THlE
CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1989, at
312 (109th ed. 1989)with DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN 24 (Mar. 1989).
Unfortunately, the data do not quite get at the importance of political representatives. Many
federal expenditures concern long-term investments or reflect demographic shifts (such as the lo-
cation of retirees), so that we would expect spending to be high in California, for example, where
there are important military installations and contractors, even if that state's political representa-
tives were completely ineffective. It is, after all, the marginal expenditures and their windfalls that
constituents crave. Texas, for example, turns out to be a state with a substantial net outflow of
federal funds, although most observers would insist that, to the extent that some states do better
at attracting federal money, Texas is second to none. These observations are not necessarily incon-
sistent because the question is what a state enjoys compared to what it would enjoy if there were
no favoritism or politics and if decisions were made only on the basis of national cost-benefit
calculations and the like.
Finally, it should be noted that the data are unhelpful because they report flows and not the
projected windfalls from or even simply the multiplier effects of federal spending. It is most un-
likely that these windfalls are the same for all varieties of spending. It is therefore theoretically
possible that there is an egalitarian (or competitively bargained) distribution of windfalls across
jurisdictions, despite the fact that the differential between tax dollars paid out and dollars spent
locally is strikingly negative in some states and positive (to very different degrees) in others.
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out consideration of direct financial incentives.38 Why isn't such bid-
ding encouraged, rather than avoided? At the very least, an explicit bid
from one state would draw attention to the government's decision and
create pressure not to award the project to another state with obvious
political connections, unless there were concrete reasons with which the
decision could be explained. The question raised by the prospect of
such "special bids" for governmental benefits, or windfalls, can be
framed either from the perspective of the decisionmaker (in this case,
the federal government") or from that of the winning and losing states.
Given that governmental expenditures often have such large positive
spillover effects on local economies, why does the fiscal policy of gov-
ernments not regularly include special taxes on those who benefit most
from major projects or, more pragmatically, obligations on recipient ju-
risdictions to raise money in whatever way they like in order to help
finance these very projects? From the perspective of the winners and
losers, the question is more evolutionary in nature and concerns the
fact that eager states (or localities in the case of state appropriations)
simply do not bid for projects in the suggested manner. Either way, the
question is why so many political decisions as to the allocation of bur-
dens and benefits are all-or-nothing ones, with no custom of partial
payments for benefits (or for burdens).40 Such bargaining over bene-
fits--or division of the pie-is obviously the central feature of bargains
in markets, and the question is why politics is so different.
38. Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1987, at A6, col. I.
39. Although the discussion in this essay focuses on bids or bargains betwecn states or other
organized interest groups and the federal government, it is easy to imagine similar transactions
between states and local governments, and it is even possible that businesses could make com-
pletely private special bids for the windfalls that come from other private businesses. Thus, when a
business contemplates liquidation, it may try to renegotiate contracts with its suppliers, but it
rarely goes to firms outside the range of its contractual orbit to suggest that the firm's continued
operation is worth something to this potential "bidder" (unless there is some chance that the
outsider will go the whole distance and take over the failing firm). Thus, a theater may be able to
extract payments from a nearby restaurant that will suffer financially if the theater closes its
doors. I mention this sort of relationship in order to note that the decisionmaker, referred to in the
text, need not be the federal government. On the other hand, I do not pursue this question of side
payments for windfalls because it confuses, rather than clarifies, the line between markets and
politics.
40. I limit the discussion below to bids for benefits, although it is also possible to imagine
jurisdictions' bidding to avoid undesirable projects, or other burdens. Such schemes would be
more difficult to organize than special bids for windfalls, however, because of the obvious strategic
behavior possibilities, such as a majority's (sometimes empty) threat to place a project in a given
location in order to extract promises or payments from nearby residents.
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B. Explaining the Absence of Special Bids
It is impossible to deal here with all reasonable explanations of
this separation between markets and politics, but before turning to
what I think are the two strongest alternatives-that politicians prefer
this separation or that political decisions are fully bargained out-it is
useful to comment briefly on a few mechanical explanations of the non-
existence of special bids and the rarity of special assessments. It is not
helpful, I think, to insist that states or localities would be unable to
raise the necessary funds in advance and that elected representatives
are unable to promise future payments. States could simply promise to
raise funds for their bids through familiar taxes, special assessments,
or, most easily, bond issues. More creatively, a state might offer to en-
rich the fisc by agreeing to federal legislation that, for example, over a
specified number of years, denied the bidding state's taxpayers the
usual deduction on their federal tax returns for state and local property
taxes. Such promises would obviously be contingent on the actual com-
pletion of the federal project, or on specific expenditures in the host
state, and on the willingness of the state's own legislature or other deci-
sionmaking body to acquiesce in the bid. But these contingencies are no
more complicated or difficult to incorporate in an agreement between
the state and the federal government than any number of other contin-
gencies that are the regular stuff of commercial contracts and intergov-
ernmental agreements. There are, of course, mechanical problems in
facilitating cooperation among a state's representatives at the local,
state, and national levels, and such cooperation is necessary in order to
make special bids. Without minimizing these problems, I think it is
unlikely that special bids have failed to materialize because elected
representatives have somewhat different agendas. The transaction costs
among these politicians should be especially low, so that there is room
for bargains and for many opportunities to share the credit for deliver-
ing large windfalls to the voters at a modest price.
Similarly, it is not the case that special bids would be a disaster
(and perhaps, therefore, have been suppressed) because poor states
could not compete with wealthy states in the bidding process. The posi-
tive economic effects of a given level of expenditures in a poor state
may well be greater than in a wealthier state. A state with more unem-
ployed workers and more depressed land values has more to gain from
new jobs and new investments and ought to bid more for a project than
a state in which the same infusion will have less of a marginal impact.
So long as capital markets work well, states can issue bonds to finance
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economically beneficial projects that will eventually generate income
and revenues with which to repay creditors. Alternatively, special bids
could be in the form of promises about future payments or tax conces-
sions. In any event, there is little reason to believe that wealthy or large
states would dominate special bidding. And, inasmuch as there is no
reason to think that the political process generously redistributes
wealth from the poor to the rich, by placing important projects in
poorer states, the absence of special bids can not be explained as part
of a larger egalitarian scheme.
Nor is it convincing to say that the transaction costs of making a
(special) bid in the face of competitive bids from other states are suffi-
ciently great to discourage bids in the first place. It is true, of course,
that, after a bid is made by Illinois, Texas and other states may put in
offers, and Illinois may counterbid, and so forth, but, if this process
discourages (rather than encourages) bids, nothing stops the federal
government from demanding or disallowing sealed bids, or encouraging
bids by announcing a short list of states in which a given project may
be placed. And when the decision is more about the size of a federal
appropriation, such as the question of how many submarines to order,
rather than about a choice among locations, as in the case of the
Supercollider, it is hard to muster a transaction costs argument at all.
It should be noted that in the system I have in mind the govern-
ment would not be required to accept the highest bid (unless it chose to
precommit to such an auction); decisionmaking would simply proceed
in a way that would be influenced both politically and financially by
the bargains that have been offered by the potential host jurisdictions.
In the case of the Supercollider, for example, it is quite plausible that
the actual decision has thus far been in the public interest, but that it
would have been still better to award the project to Illinois in return for
a sum of money-or, better yet, to locate the project in Texas, but to
receive from that state an especially large share of the construction
costs. 41 In short, bargains and auctions are sufficiently popular and flex-
ible outside the political arena to make it unlikely that they could not
work well within the context of political decisionmaking.
41. That is, larger than what Texas offered in what might have been regarded as merely the
first round of bidding. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that the special bid mechanism I have in mind is only somewhat similar to
the familiar practice of state and local governments' offering tax concessions or various services in
order to induce migration into the jurisdiction or in order to encourage significant employers not
to emigrate. Among other things, the intergovernmental character of special bids is a distinguish-
ing feature that draws attention to the (sometimes thin) line between markets and politics.
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A more promising explanation of the absence of special bids draws
on the observation that people "irrationally" value what they already
have and undervalue diffuse opportunity losses.4" A classic example is
that many people who would never purchase an expensive painting or
bottle of wine would also not sell such a painting or bottle if one were
found in their own cellars. 3 It seems to be psychologically more diffi-
cult to alter the status quo than to hang on to the assets with which one
is already endowed. Correspondingly, it is possible that citizens and
their politicians do not make special bids because they underestimate
the economic benefits they can derive in the future from some govern-
mental project, and, at the same time, they are psychologically disin-
clined to part with assets they already enjoy. I do not put much stock
in this "perception-based" argument because it raises more questions
than it answers. If people overvalue what they have and undervalue
future benefits, then why do we run budget deficits rather than sur-
pluses? One would think that governmental expenditures themselves
would seem unattractive because they require current outlays and often
promise only diffuse future benefits. But this is not the place to explore
the cognitive psychology literature and its relevance to legal or even to
political theory, for in this literature I see no easy explanation for the
absence of special bids.
In the end, I believe, there emerges a pessimistic and an optimistic
explanation of why we do not allocate projects through special bids. As
alluded to earlier, the pessimistic possibility is that there are electoral
rewards to incumbents who can secure windfalls for their constituents
and that lavish attention is paid to politicians whose efforts are needed
to secure such windfalls. To the extent that politicians serve as in-
termediaries in the quest for such projects, it is natural that they would
disfavor a system in which their influence played somewhat less of a
role, while bids played more of a role. Without emphasizing the cogni-
tive aspects of risk aversion, it is possible to note that risk averse politi-
cians might not be much tempted to buy windfalls for their constituents
through special bids because of the fear that occasionally a project
would produce much less of a windfall than had been expected, so that
42. One might think of this "endowment effect" as related to "anchoring," or the tendency to
adjust inadequately away from the starting point one is given. See Scott, Error and Rationality In
Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the
Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 338-42 (1986).
43. Id. at 340; see also Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology In
the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 669, 678-79 (1979) (introducing example of offer-asking
differential for expensive bottle of wine).
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their constituents would have overbid and been burdened by the award
of the project. It is possible, of course, that the politicians who brokered
the original bargain could be blamed for such a disappointment.
There is reason to be dubious about this simple, pessimistic expla-
nation. The argument requires us to believe that voters do not notice
that there are losers on the other side of the ledger from winners and
their windfalls, because at the root of the argument is the sense that
politicians may not chase windfalls on behalf of their constituents be-
cause they prefer to leave well enough alone. And constituents could
only be satisfied with this state of affairs (and not elect new entrants
who proposed bidding for windfalls) if they believed that they received
at least their "fair share" of windfalls. It is hard to believe in a novel
kind of "fiscal illusion," under which virtually all citizens believe that
they gain from a system in which windfalls are dispensed at low cost.
Surely politicians will sometimes be blamed for not bringing home the
project, so that politicians as a group might just as well prefer not to
intermediate (with special bids or other market mechanisms) among
potential windfall recipients. The easy life for a politician might be one
in which constituents did not believe that there were free lunches out
there for their representatives to secure for them. Moreover, a system
that included special bids would enable the elected representatives of
the "losing" states, which were not awarded projects because their
characteristics and bids together proved less attractive than some other
state's package of political, technical, and financial offerings, to boast
that they had been instrumental in landing bargains for the taxpayers.
Thus, a shipbuilding program currently allows politicians from Con-
necticut, Virginia, and a few other states (including some where sub-
contracting is done) to boast of their political effectiveness. With spe-
cial bidding, however, many states' politicians would no doubt be able
to claim that they were instrumental in extracting larger payments
from the host states (thus, reducing their own constituents' tax burdens
or freeing federal funds for other projects of local interest). And these
claims may even be made while Connecticut and Virginia politicians
boast that they brought home the shipbuilding program with low spe-
cial bids. Everyone is obviously not better off than in a world where
there are no special bids and most projects go forward, but the point is
that bargains falling on the "contract curve" make everyone better off
than they would be with no bargains at all, and such bargains allow
politicians to insist that they superbly negotiated a healthy share of the
gains from trade. Much as politicians now take credit for introducing
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and sponsoring some pieces of legislation, they could be expected to
take credit for extracting huge sums in return for projects that clearly
needed to be undertaken (even without special bids). To the extent that
politicians are most interested in short-term results, for their electoral,
careerist, and other selfish aims, it would seem especially likely that a
reputation for extracting bids and for getting something done for
"nothing" would be most advantageous. In short, it seems possible that
politicians would be better and not worse off in a system with special
bidding. As such, it is difficult to be convinced by the pessimistic expla-
nation as to why special bidding, or a similar mechanism, is not part of
our political landscape.
There is obviously a great deal more that might be said about the
self-interest of politicians as it pertains to the evolution of (what might
be thought of as) markets in politics, but, rather than extending this
discussion, it is fair to say that it is possible, but hardly certain, that we
do not see special bids (and more special assessments, perhaps) because
they are not in the interest of politicians. My own view is that it is
unlikely that politicians are more than a small part of the story. I have
already suggested that it is far from clear that special bids are not in
their self-interest, and, even if it were clear, there would remain the
question of why so many institutions and political rules that are not in
the self-interest of politicians have evolved while this one did not.
Moreover, the short-run attraction of special bids seems quite powerful.
When all is said and done, I believe that, on the eve of the Supercol-
lider decision, I would have advised Illinois's politicians to offer a spe-
cial tax or payment in a bold step on behalf of both their constituents'
economic interests and their own careers.
A variant of the pessimistic explanation focuses on the majority
coalition itself, rather than on the incentives of politicians. A ruling
majority coalition may be able to exploit a minority by taxing all citi-
zens while awarding benefits to themselves. There is political bargain-
ing among the constituents of the majority coalition, but, the argument
runs, there is no need to give much to the out-of-power minority-and
special bids would allow the minority to get some of the gains, because
the majority would have insufficient information with which to extract
full value from the minority bidders. The problem with this version of
the argument is, first, that the ruling .majority, if government can be
thought of as that, is not forced to award projects to the highest bidder
so that, in fact, the majority should welcome the institution of special
bids because projects will be awarded either to members of this major-
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ity or to minority bidders (who may value some projects more than do
members of the ruling coalition) when the majority prefers to receive
what is bid, rather than to award the project to one of its own. More-
over, majority coalitions can not be terribly stable if only because out-
siders will constantly compete to displace members of the coalition. As
such, the mystery is why interests not included in governing coalitions
do not make special bids and also why marginal members of the ruling
coalition, who may receive few of the benefits of power (because they
are easily replaced by others who are eager to receive even very little in
return for their votes), do not make special bids in order to get more
windfalls than the logrolling process deals their way.
The optimistic explanation for the way things work is, as usual,
that they already work well. In particular, politicians are not (and, in
most circumstances, obviously should not be) above bargaining with the
currency at their disposal: political support and votes for expenditures
and other matters of interest. Connecticut and Virginia may not bid or
pay directly for shipbuilding programs, the argument runs, but their
elected representatives must build coalitions with politicians from other
states and must vote for projects in other states "in return for" ship-
building programs, or at least increases in such programs. The optimist
might say that in markets hard currency dominates as the means of
exchange because the overwhelming majority of participants have noth-
ing more useful to offer, whereas in politics, votes, especially those cast
in the immediate future, are more popular because they are as useful
as cash (or better) and, perhaps, because logrolling entails lower trans-
action costs than bidding (of the sort we are exploring). The explana-
tion is not, it should be emphasized, simply that logrolling is a good
thing or that rampant logrolling is better than none (a proposition most
modern political theorists and observers would find easy to defend, I
think), but rather that logrolling works so well that it dominates the
alternative of logrolling plus bidding. The argument must be that ex-
plicit and implicit political bargaining works so well that windfalls and
burdens come close to balancing out across jurisdictions. Politics is a
market, in other words, and it is one where bidding with hard currency
has no substantial comparative advantage.
It is hard to brush by this argument without trying to link it to
various strands of public choice theory, some of which limit its claim.
Most of the complexities, I think, come to light once one realizes that
coalitions do not need to satisfy all enfranchised voters, or their repre-
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sentatives, but rather a set large enough to control things (at the ex-
pense of the minority, one presumes) under the prevailing decisionmak-
ing rules. If, for example, governing political coalitions tend toward
their minimum necessary size-the argument being that a super-
majority coalition could do better for its remaining members by casting
out the unnecessary and most expensive extra members-then it may
well be that their members bargain efficiently with one another but
that nonmembers ought to make explicit, or special, bids when compet-
ing for windfalls with other nonmembers."' The same may be true if
there is intense competition to be part of the decisionmaking coalition
so that there are rather lean windfalls for coalition members and their
constituents.45 Unfortunately, ideas and questions are more plentiful
than are answers about the dynamics and efficiency of political coali-
tions, and, in the face of these unknowns, my instinct is to suggest that
of course there is logrolling, or bargained-for exchanges, in politics but
that it is only remotely possible that there is such perfect bargaining
that we live in the best of all possible worlds. It seems most unlikely
that a state is not really better off when its elected representatives en-
joy longevity and exalted positions and most implausible that expres-
sions such as "a powerful committee chairperson" completely miss the
mark of what politics is about. It goes almost without saying that evi-
dence of large interstate windfalls or of truly powerful politi-
cians-evidence, in other words, that the political market is not as effi-
cient as many observers believe the stock market to be4"-does not
44. For the idea that winning coalitions may tend toward the minimum necessary size, see W.
RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962). Further applications of the "size princi-
ple" are discussed in W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL
THEORY 176-201 (1973). Even if coalition insiders have bargained smoothly among themselves, I
would expect interest groups that are outside the ruling coalition to bid against one another for the
windfalls available to them from projects agreed to by the governing coalition. And the governing
coalition will sometimes recognize that the windfalls generated by locating a project in a jurisdic-
tion not represented in the governing coalition are sufficiently greater than those available to coali-
tion members that it is worthwhile to favor outsiders and to extract some of the windfalls through
these special bids.
45. The idea is that insiders do not necessarily live luxuriously because their colleagues stand
ready to exclude them from the ruling coalition and to admit, instead, a less greedy outsider into
membership. As such, insiders compete, as it were, to enjoy some of the surplus-but not so much
that they are regarded as expendable. In this climate, insiders may well be expected to bid for
windfalls. Perhaps the easiest way to see this point is to think of the marginal product. In equilib-
rium, each member of the ruling coalition has already extracted whatever it can from the coali-
tion, and, now, if it wants more, it must offer something in return (and, indeed, must compete
with nonmembers who bid for similar benefits).
46. In both the stock market and the political "market," there is room for argument about
strong and weak forms of efficiency. If a few investors or mutual funds regularly outperform the
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prove that what I have called the optimistic explanation for politics as
we know it is wrong. It remains to be seen whether special bids and
assessments can find a place alongside pork-barrel legislation.47 Mean-
while, I think it fair to say only that the truth probably lies somewhere
in between the optimistic and pessimistic explanations. It is possible, as
the optimistic explanation suggests, that political bargains have occu-
pied at least some of the space that more traditional market transac-
tions might have filled. But it may also be the case that imperfections
in the political marketplace have blocked the evolution of special bids
or other political bargains. My goal in this article, however, is not to
explain the absence of special bids. I emphasize the puzzle of the ab-
sence of special bids, with no claim as to its solution. Indeed, I take a
normative approach below and suggest that we ought to encourage the
use of special bids as part of an attempt to improve the quality and the
product of our political life. Meanwhile, my plan is to gain some under-
standing of the law of takings by contemplating the optimistic explana-
tion of the absence of special bids and by accepting the fact that it
provides some real insight, even though it may not entirely explain the
absence of special bids. In thinking about the separation between mar-
kets and politics, insofar as the distribution of benefits is concerned,
there is something to be learned about the imposition of burdens.
C. Protected Minorities
In Part I, we considered the questions of why the government is
sometimes required to pay for the burdens it imposes; virtually never
interested in collecting payments, or "reverse compensation," from the
parties it especially benefits; and regularly able to burden citizens with
taxes without more than the slightest danger of having such levies
branded as (compensable) takings. The optimistic explanation of why
we have not seen special bids offers a real clue, I think, to answering
these questions. If this optimistic explanation is restated as suggesting
that in large part politicians bargain on behalf of their constituents to
stock market, then one might need to retreat to a claim that on the margin given all the effort
already put in to gathering information, it is impossible to outperform the market. Similarly.
evidence of powerful politicians or of horizontally enriched jurisdictions suggests that there may
be some hurdles to perfectly competitive bargaining in the political arena, but it leaves room to
argue that on the margin special bids may not materialize because bargaining that is internal to
the political process competes away all the available windfalls.
47. On the virtues of logrolling, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TuuLocK, supra note 17; on the
conflict between logrolling and party discipline, see W. RiKER & P. ORDEStlOOK, supra note 44, at
112-14.
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such a degree that explicit market transactions in the allocation of pub-
lic goods and their side effects are unnecessary,48 then it becomes more
apparent why taxes are fundamentally different from public projects,
and, in turn, why such expenditures are completely unlike most regula-
tory burdens. If our task is to understand why the fifth amendment
deals with some burdens by bringing markets into politics (by giving
market-like protection against political action), while on the expendi-
ture side markets are separated from politics (or are regarded as al-
ready contained in politics), we can build on the idea that the opti-
mist's claim that politics is a market rings true to the extent that well-
established interest groups and coalitions do seem to bargain with so-
phistication at least .equal to that possessed by most consumers in the
economic marketplace. In short, although we may not have a complete
answer as to why political bargains are not supplemented with market
transactions, such as special bids, it is useful to build on the idea that
at least some political bargains are the products of extensive bargaining
and trading. And politics is most likely to resemble perfect markets
when affected interests are organized, repeat players.
With coalition politics as the focal point of our understanding of
the relationship between markets and politics, the asymmetry, or incon-
sistency, highlighted in Part I is explained as follows: states, profes-
sions, and other organized interest groups are meant to take care of
themselves in the political arena, in contrast to an individual whose
property is taken for the building of a highway or other public purpose,
who is obviously ill-equipped to engage in logrolling bargains. I am
suggesting that the legal system regards an organized interest group,
however much in the minority it may be, as very different from an
individual or collection of citizens that but once in a lifetime face a
common burden. Easily organized interest groups are regarded as pro-
tected in the main4 9 by the political process in which the group will
48. The optimistic argument could be extended to the point of insisting that large campaign
contributions are tools that can sometimes promote the public interest by measuring intensity of
preferences. I do not, however, mean to suggest that such optimism is the least bit justified. Spe-
cial bids involve wealth transfers to other citizens and permit the society to enjoy more public
goods while keeping down tax rates (and, therefore, distortions created by high tax rates), while
campaign contributions (like some corrupt payments) may involve wealth transfers to politi-
cians-and, in the quest for such payments, it may well be in the interest of politicians to favor
larger spending programs and higher tax rates. In any event, note that the pessimistic explanation
for the absence of special bids is that politicians intentionally suppress markets in order to expand
the reach of politics.
49. 1 allude here to the well-known and well-articulated point that some groups may have
been sufficiently excluded for so long that it will not do to say that they can now strike deals
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learn to organize and compete. In contrast, "occasional individuals" are
protected by the takings clause. It is unlikely that such individuals can
compete effectively in the political arena and it would be undesirable
for them to try; the transaction costs of individual involvement in poli-
tics is, after all, quite great. While I do not pretend that this distinction
has any strong historical basis, for this is a theory not about original
intent5" but about how the law has evolved and should evolve, it is
tempting to ground the distinction in the fifth amendment itself and to
suggest that when the final clause of the amendment instructs that "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion" it contrasts "private" with "public" to hint at the distinction be-
tween isolated and organized owners or interests.0 1 The organized ones
are less private and more public, in the same (familiar, rather than
legal) sense that a state or the American Medical Association is a
fairly public entity.
In sum, I have suggested that we may not find "special bids," or
other examples of markets in politics, either because they are not in the
interests of politicians or because bargains among political coalitions
offer a successful enough substitute for more explicit market transac-
within the political process. See J. ELY, DalocACYc AND DISRusT 75-87, 135-79 (1980).
50. For some discussion of the historical context of the "just compensation" clause, see Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 58 (1964) (concluding that there is not much
available information or analysis of the historical context or original meaning, but that the clause
can be understood as "designed to prevent arbitrary government action, rather than to preserve
the economic status quo").
51. The distinction developed in the text will remind administrative lawyers of the difference
between Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). An adjudicative hearing is likely to be required when few
people are burdened, while rulemaking is usually permissible when large numbers of people are
affected or when individualized facts are not relevant to the rulemaking. See generally Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L REV. 1044, 1123-27 (1984) (contrasting "gen-
eral action," or rulemaking, with more individualized adjudication, where due process protection is
required).
The connection between political bargaining ("pluralism" as opposed to "republicanism")
and the fifth amendment is touched on in Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 50 (1985). In discussing the relationship between conceptions of the political
process and administrative law doctrine, Professor Sunstein points out that normally the
processes of representation are a sufficient guaranty of legitimacy, in the sense that repre-
sentation will ensure adequate responsiveness to the public at large. By contrast, in adju-
dicative proceedings-when a single person or small group is singled out for special treat-
ment-participation is required. When a personal or narrowly held interest is at stake,
the processes of representation are unlikely to be of sufficient help. Hence the rule, funda-
mental to administrative law, that the due process clause requires the right to participate
only in adjudicative proceedings.
Id. at 67.
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tions. But whether or not politics generally works well enough to make
markets unnecessary, it is arguable that the law might import market
mechanisms into politics precisely where there is reason to think that
political coalitions will not form or will not bargain effectively. The
argument, in short, is that politics works least well when it affects citi-
zens who have difficulty influencing political bargains, and that it is
just when politics is least perfect that our legal system insists upon the
use of markets. In contrast, when politics works well, there is no consti-
tutional resort to markets. Thus, the requirement of explicit compensa-
tion (in imitation of market transactions) for some takings might be
understood as protective of individuals who can not easily make politics
part of their business. On the other hand, it is not puzzling that taxes
are not takings, because taxes are generally levied on such bases as
corporate revenues, all real property owners, cigarettes, fuels, and retail
sales, which either draw in to the tax base an enormous number of
citizens (so that there is every reason to think that the magnitude and
design of each tax will be of great interest to politicians) or affect inter-
est groups that can be well organized. Inasmuch as taxes are likely to
be the subject of careful political bargaining, the positive argument
goes, there is no need to import an explicit market mechanism as pro-
tection against exploitative majoritarian rule. Put differently, the dis-
tinction between organized interests and relatively powerless individu-
als (and groups)-a distinction that comes close to one used in other
areas of law-can yield real insight if applied to takings law.
III. TAKINGS AND POLITICS
A. Takings from Unprotected Minorities
1. Political Coalitions and Takings Theory
Although this is hardly the place to develop a complete predictive
theory of all of takings law, especially because such a theory must
surely have more pieces to it than the one I have here Suggested, my
argument requires some evidence that takings law is actually sensitive
to the ease with which those who endure politically imposed burdens
can bargain within the political arena. What seems true about taxes
and politics in broad perspective must bear further fruit in the details
of takings law and practice, where burdens and benefits are truly meted
out.
These details may seem more interesting and easier to organize if
the positive theory I am about to explore is set against a background
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containing the history and theoretical justifications of takings law. In a
much compressed nutshell, this context can be described as follows: A
central theme of takings law is that protection is offered against the
possibility that majorities may mistreat minorities. A paradigmatic
case is that of a community of landowners who combine to expropriate
the property of one landowner for their community's enjoyment. 2 Such
majoritarian, or gang, law is thought unfair because of an equal treat-
ment principle, which is especially compelling when the community's
needs would be met just as well by using any piece of land, or because
of the realistic fear that the ganging up will too often be at the expense
of the neighbor who is most different or most nonconforming. It is also
inefficient both in terms of the behavior of property owners and that of
majorities. Property owners will be somewhat discouraged from invest-
ing in their property to the extent that they fear uncompensated losses.
The argument seems relatively convincing when it contemplates risk
averse owners, and, indeed, commentators have suggested (mostly as a
normative matter) that takings law be viewed as insurance.03 The argu-
ment is on its most solid ground when long-term investments, or activ-
ity levels, are at stake, rather than one-shot investments. Thus, it is
easy to see that if governments do not pay for the crops they take from
farms located near a frontier to feed wartime troops then farmers will
neither plant nor harvest (and the government had better hope the war
is a short one).54 In contrast, a government that does not pay the going
market wages of doctors and lawyers who are drafted in time of war is
unlikely to have a major negative effect on the rate at which young
citizens enter these professions.5 Finally, as far as governmental be-
havior is concerned, a majority or bureaucratic structure that can do as
52. The discussion in the text is informed by the rich and varied literature on takings law. See.
e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); Michelman, Property. Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, supra
note 50; Sax, supra note 4. For a recent statement of the point, see Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987), where it is noted that if one landowner had been singled
out to provide views of the ocean to the public then a statute otherwise valid might violate the
takings or equal protection clauses.
53. Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAu.n L
REV. 569 (1984).
54. Of course, a sensibly run government would pay for these crops even if it were not go:-
erned by a constitutional amendment precisely because without such compensation supplies will
dry up. In this light, the fifth amendment, and its counterparts in other legal systems, is best seen
as a precommitment strategy through which the government is able to signal potential suppliers
that they need not wait and see whether this government is sensible.
55. The same might be said of investment in oil refineries if the government does not pay for a
refinery it destroys in order to prevent its fall into enemy hands. In both cases, a given investor (or
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it pleases with no budgetary consequences is likely to do too much,
while one that must internalize the costs it imposes, by paying the mar-
ket value of what it takes or destroys, will be more likely to resist
projects that fail a cost-benefit test.
All of these familiar explanations of the core of takings law are
consistent with the argument developed earlier regarding minorities
that need protection, groups that can bargain for themselves within the
political arena, and the relevance of this distinction to understanding
taxes and takings. The fairness argument can be restated simply to say
that the law reflects a concern for minorities that are unlikely to be
able to take care of themselves through the political process. There is
no reason not to incorporate some equal protection law into this point,
so that, if a "discrete and insular" minority were overtaxed, or if its
properties were especially burdened with a regulation, it would not be
surprising or inappropriate for the law to resort to takings law (al-
though other law may be more attractive for this purpose) in order to
protect the minority that had a history of being the odd group out in
political bargains. When the possibilities of coalition politics are in-
cluded in the efficiency argument, it is plain that investment is not dis-
couraged by rules that promise either compensation or simply the abil-
ity to bargain with one's investment in the political arena. It is true, I
suppose, that in theory a group's political power is either formidable or
not, regardless of whether it is threatened with losses through govern-
mental actions. But it seems likely that an interest group will work
harder to save itself from $X in losses than to gain $X in windfalls,
perhaps because it fights more for what it has than for what it wishes it
had or because other citizens share a taste for the preservation of the
status quo or for some reason related to the general question of why
there is an "offer-asking" differential.56 In any event, a democratic gov-
ernment that could take without paying compensation would almost
surely affect individual investment projects more than it would projects
entering professional student) will discount the possibility of war and will recognize that, at worst,
what will be lost is a fraction of the value of the investment. See United States v. Caltex (Phil.),
Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (no compensable taking where oil company's terminal facilities inten-
tionally demolished prior to enemy takeover of the area). A better explanation of the decision may
be that what the company lost, in light of the imminent fall into enemy hands, was worth close to
nothing.
56. This differential, or the fact that endowments influence one's ability to pay for things, is
discussed critically in M. KELNIAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 141-50 (1987); Kel-
man, supra note 43; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). Note that the argument in the text does not depend on the existence of
a cognitive illusion or an offer-asking differential. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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that are under the watchful eye of a powerful interest group. To the
extent that we have difficulty giving examples of this difference, I think
it is because we are so accustomed to the notion that the government
does not much harm the interests of powerful groups without either
offering some compensation or, more to the point, giving something in
return from other groups or with respect to other interests of the appar-
ent losers. Finally, the internalization argument is most easily reformu-
lated. Inasmuch as organized interest groups do protect themselves, do
make their interests known, and do not give up things in return for
nothing at all, majority coalitions or their agents are forced to internal-
ize the costs they impose on these interests. Takings law thus forces the
actual payment of compensation to unprotected individuals or groups
that do not regularly participate in political bargains because it is with
respect to these citizens that the government must be made to internal-
ize costs that it might not otherwise take into account.
2. Rent Control, Zoning, and Nuisance Cases
Consider, as a first example, the imposition of rent control on
landlords. If we did not know that such controls were regularly legis-
lated and that landlords do not much like them-and it would be
harmless or meaningless, at least from a landlord's perspective, to have
rent control if the foregone income were simply returned after just
compensation was required-we would have been tempted to predict
that a government that enacted rent control would be found to have
taken property within the meaning of the fifth amendment (and cer-
tainly within the meaning of similar and often more emphatic provi-
sions in state constitutions5 7 ). Rent control presents us, after all, with a
situation in which a majority may be ganging up on a minority (one
does not expect to see democratically elected representatives voting ret-
rospective rent increases, for example, in part because there would be
more outraged voters than enriched voters), investment in apartment
buildings may be inefficiently discouraged, and governments may think
only of the savings to some citizens, while not internalizing the drop in
57. It is noteworthy that attacks on nonconfiscatory rent control statutes have not been suc-
cessful even under state constitutional law. See. e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644,
693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984) (city may restrict landlords' profit with rent control so
long as landlords not deprived of reasonable rate of return). affid, 475 US. 260 (1986); Hutton
Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 350 A.2d 1 (1975) (municipal rent control statute
constitutional so long as it permits landlord just and reasonable rate of return); Lopez v. Mirabel,
127 A.D.2d 771, 512 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1987) (valid exercise of police power).
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property values (which signals, again, the disincentive effect of rent
control on investment in rental property) suffered by others. But when
the fifth amendment is understood as protecting minority interests that
are not represented in political bargains, it is easy to "predict" that
rent control schemes will not be regarded as takings because such stat-
utes apply not to a landlord here and there but to a large set of land-
lords who can (and do) easily unite to bargain about this and other
legislation affecting their mutual interests. Landlords may often lose
this battle against existing tenants,58 but they may be able to join
forces with other political interest groups and see to packages of legis-
lation that do not include rent control, that contain only mild controls,
or that provide offsetting benefits.
Another way to see this point is to note that, instead of rent con-
trol, the government might have enacted a tax on rents, much like
there are hotel room taxes, or on rent increases, or on one of these
bases but with a transition rule exempting rents paid by tenants on the
premises at the time of the enactment. These taxes would mirror the
effects of more familiar rent control statutes to different degrees, but
surely no one would have expected these taxes to be struck down as
surreptitious takings. A large tax on one and only one landlord, hard as
it is to imagine, would no doubt be struck down one way or an-
other-and it goes without saying that a single landlord is more help-
less politically than are landlords in general.59 The tantalizing thing
about this example is that rent control statutes aimed only at mobile
home park owners are occasionally struck down. 60 There is more to this
58. These tenants obviously outnumber their landlords. Note, however, that potential tenants
may rationally prefer that there not be rent control legislation because present tenants are far
more likely to vacate uncontrolled units. Thus, potential tenants who sense that they will enjoy
significant consumer surplus (because they place a higher value on renting than is represented by
the market price, which reflects marginal values) will prefer more vacancies to a small chance of
obtaining a rent controlled unit.
59. It is noteworthy that rent control statutes generally do not apply to landlords who control
only a very few units. And these landlords, who may devote little time to the one or two cottages
or basement apartments they own, would plainly face relatively high costs in organizing into an
effective political force. Still, because there can be little doubt but that rent control laws could
apply to single-unit landlords, with no danger of judicial intervention, it is best to understand the
exclusion of such units from rent control statutes as reflecting either populist, majoritarian politics
or the fact that the additional administrative costs of including single rental units in a rent control
scheme would be considerable.
60. On mobile home parks, see Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1986)
(emphasizing that rent control statute enabled park tenants, who owned the mobile homes, to sell
their homes and locations and enjoy the capitalized value of the regulated rents); Gregory v. City
of San Juan Capistrano, 142 Cal. App. 3d 72, 191 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1983) (statutory scheme grant-
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difference in results than the single variable explored in this article, but
it is noteworthy that there are often very few mobile home parks in a
given jurisdiction so that the owner or owners of the mobile home park
or parks may be just the sort of (true political) minority protected by
takings law. Similarly, price or wage controls directed at one business,
rather than at an entire industry (or at the economy as a whole), rhay
well trigger judicial protection. On the other hand, controls that do not
go so far as to deny a minimal market rate of return and that are
applied to an entire industry or economy are just the sort of thing that
is resolved in the political arena where most of the affected parties are
represented."
ing residents of mobile home park right of first refusal on sale of park held unconstitutional):
Department of Business Regulation v. National Manufactured Hous. Fed'n, Inc., 370 So. 2d 1132
(Fla. 1979) (mobile home park rent control statute unconstitutional because it allowed adminis-
trative agency too much discretion and was not restricted in time); Hirsch & Hirsch. Legal-Eco-
nomic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy
Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REv. 399 (1988). See also Comment, Mobile Home Parks and Connecti-
cut's Regulatory Scheme; A Takings Analysis, 17 CONN. L REv. 811 (1985) (arguing unconsti-
tutionality of state's scheme). My point is that statutory schemes such as those reviewed in the
cited cases would more likely have been found acceptable had they been drafted to cover rental
apartments rather than mobile homes. Statutes giving insiders, or current tenants, favorable prices
in the context of apartment-to-condominium conversions come to mind.
It should be noted that in developing a positive theory about takings law it is normally imma-
terial whether a statute is struck down or is found to trigger payments (under the fifth amend-
ment) to burdened parties. Put differently, if a rent control statute is struck down, the government
could revisit the matter and affirmatively take and pay for the property or interest in question
because there is virtually no danger of a modern court holding that the taking was not for a
"public purpose." See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984): see also Com-
ment, supra; Note, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domaln-A Requiem, 60 TUL L
REv. 419 (1985).
61. Controls that cause any business or industry to lose money are essentially treated as physi-
cal takings-and the rule of thumb is that there is constitutional protection, although temporary
losses may be found acceptable. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77. The point in the text is
that controls that cut into profits, but not so far as to deny permanently a "reasonable" rate of
return, will be far more vulnerable if directed at a particular business, rather than at an industry
or other easily organized political interest group. For a sample of judicial reaction to controls
affecting entire (or large parts of) industries, see FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 US. 245
(1987) (regulations empowering the Commission to set rates that utilities may charge.cable televi-
sion systems for using utility poles not a taking because not confiscatory): Regional Rail Reorg.
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (comprehensive plan affecting nation's railroads would amount to
a taking (only) to the extent that constitutional minimum rate of return is denied); Mapco Inc. v.
Carter, 573 F.2d 1268 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (rollback of domestic oil prices not unconstitu-
tional because not confiscatory), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d
580 (9th Cir. 1959) (allowing caps on gold prices even if further mining and refining becomes
unprofitable), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933 (1960); Minden Beef Co. v. Cost of Living Council, 362
F. Supp. 298 (D. Neb. 1973) (no taking even though cap on beef prices causes producers to lose
money). My claim is essentially that similar price controls aimed at one or two firms within these
industries would have triggered judicial intervention.
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The same distinction between governmentally imposed burdens on
truly unprotected minorities and on groups that can work through the
political process is fruitful in working through zoning cases. In many
ways, zoning is the mirror image of special assessments. But in contrast
to special assessments, which once seemed quite promising but which
declined in popularity, zoning is a relatively new innovation that has
spread to the point where it is as familiar to most citizens as are the
most popular taxes. In any event, we would now expect that zoning
done on a large scale would be free of constitutional restraints, but that
zoning that narrowly singled out an individual, or a small group that
did not otherwise have much in common for the purpose of political
organization, would be the kind of burden that might either be re-
garded as a "regulatory taking," triggering compensation, or would, in
some other way, be constrained by courts. And it is certainly the case
that most zoning schemes are accepted as part and parcel of what good
(or at least legitimate) governments do,"2 and that zoning-like plans,
such as one that restricts the number of apartment-to-condominium
conversions in a city 3 or one that allows prostitution in a given zone
and thus burdens residents who live in adjacent areas,6 4 are held not to
require compensation to those who are burdened by these governmental
actions. In all these cases, the burdened interests are capable of effec-
tive participation in the political arena. In contrast, I think it fair to
say that there is reason to think that the more a property was singled
out in a zoning scheme, the more likely it would be that its owner could
successfully object and obtain compensation.65
62. The pivotal case was Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926)
(zoning ordinance upheld despite 75% loss in property's value). The Court's recent decision in
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), casts some fresh doubt on zoning
schemes. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 43. Without wandering too far from my purpose in this
essay, I can safely say that I do not think this will in fact be an area that is revisited by the Court.
63. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Jackson Court Condominiums v.
New Orleans, 665 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. La. 1987); Traweek v. City & County of San Francisco,
659 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
64. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
65. For examples of zoning regulations struck down as going beyond the generous boundaries
of Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. at 395 (zoning regulations valid unless "clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare"),
see I E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 135-40 (4th ed. 1978). On the idea that a zoning
scheme will be invalidated (or found to be a compensable taking) because a very few property
owners are inordinately burdened or singled out, see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4, which hints at
this vulnerability of what has been called "reverse spot zoning." Recent cases that can be said to
reflect this point include Mcllhinney v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 72 Pa. Commw. 129, 455 A2d 1284
(1983) (finding spot zoning of parcel near interstate highway arbitrary), and Thompson v. City of
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The difficult line-drawing problem among regulatory takings, nui-
sances, and mere (non-nuisance and non-negligent) annoyances is also
simplified and rationalized by a perspective that focuses on political
coalitions. In United States v. Causby,66 overflights from a military
base, which caused deaths among plaintiff's chickens, were analogized
by the Court to actual, physical takings, and, in Griggs v. Allegheny
County,6" 7 intense noise from an airport was found to constitute the tak-
ing of an "air easement." But quite plainly, noise and other pollution
from airports, highways, and other facilities do not normally entitle vic-
tims to compensation.6 8 It is, therefore, remarkable that both Causby
and Griggs involved uniquely situated victims who would be unlikely to
find close political allies. In contrast, of course, most noise problems
emanating from airports and highways affect large numbers of people
and are regular grist for the political process.
Batten v. United States" may provide the (admittedly and inevita-
bly sloppy) dividing line between minorities that are part of the politi-
cal process and those that are "unprotected." In Batten, no compensa-
tion was allowed to ten homeowners who lived near an air base in a
Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974) (disallowing city's attempt to downzone one vacant lot
located at intersection). Other recent cases that fit this pattern, but which can also be described as
protecting the reliance interest of property owners, see infra note 74. include Wheeler v. City of
Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1981) (dealing with law banning apartment construction,
passed to block a particular real estate development that had received earlier zoning clearance),
and Township of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 109 Pa. Commw. 200, 531 A.2d 49 (1987)
(city granted permit for waste treatment plant; community opposition caused township council to
rescind permit and rezone area to prevent operation of plant), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 622, 554
A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1748 (1989).
66. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
67. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
68. See, e.g., Citizen's Ass'n v. International Raceways, Inc., 833 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir.
1987) ("any diminution in value of private property [from city's granting permit for racing to
defendant] is rationally related to the governmental interest in the raceway"); Nunally v. United
States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956) (finding government's use of nearby grounds for testing
naval guns and flying aircraft not a taking of resident's property); Love v. Navarro, 262 F. Supp.
520 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (denying recovery to homeowner burdened by construction of pearby high-
way); see also Gandal, Governmental Liability for Nonphysical Damage to Land. 2 Una. LAw.
315 (1970) (advocating liability in many settings); Thompson, An Externality from Governmen-
tally Owned Property May Be a Nuisance or Even a Taking, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS.
supra note 14, at 203.
State constitutions may offer the burdened property owner some hope of recovery because
these constitutions address property that is "damaged" as well as "taken." A. Niciots' TIE LAW
OF E INENT DOMAIN § 6.20 (3d ed. 1988); see supra note 13. One commentator has, however,
found that state constitutions do not, in reality, provide a more useful tool to burdened property
owners. Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 Mic. L RE v. 1373, 1399-1404 (1965).
69. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962). cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
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small town in homes they had acquired prior to the base's expansion,
and who complained about noise and smoke after the air base was en-
larged. The court distinguished the case from Causby by insisting that
no direct overflights were involved in Batten," a hollow argument inas-
much as overflights at any altitude are on their own obviously not re-
garded as takings. I do not mean to imply that the ten homeowners
could have weighed into the political process, found allies, and battled
the Pentagon, while the single landowners in Causby and Griggs won
because they could not. Rather, I note that the theory requires some
awkwardly drawn line between "interest groups" and "unprotected mi-
norities," because one can hardly claim that only singly burdened citi-
zens get market compensation while others who are burdened get only
whatever the political arena yields, and that the group in Batten may
have had the ear of an elected representative or, more likely, may sim-
ply have fallen on the wrong side of the awkward line.
3. Other Cases Involving Unprotected Minorities
Inasmuch as I have attempted in this article to set forth only one
piece of a positive theory of takings law, it is less productive to draw
attention to other cases or areas of takings law that are explained by
the unprotected minorities idea71 than it is to suggest areas in which
this idea might explain the actual decisions-but in which one might
predict an opposite result if the burdens imposed by government were
differently distributed. I have chosen three cases out of many, with the
sense that they give a fair picture of the larger landscape. In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States,72 a single corporation, Kaiser Aetna, invested
enormous sums in Hawaii to convert a shallow, land-locked pond into a
navigable body of water connected to the Pacific Ocean by an eight-
foot-deep channel. The resulting inlet, and the marina constructed
within it, was the focal point of a residential community developed by
Kaiser Aetna. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, which had
70. Id. at 584 ("We are cited to no decisions holding that the United States is liable for noise,
vibration, or smoke without a physical invasion. In Causby, Griggs, and a number of lower court
decisions . . . there were regular flights over the property. Absent such physical invasion recovery
has been uniformly denied."). State constitutional decisions have been more inclined to find "con-
demnation by nuisance" from alongside, rather than overhead, flights. See W. STOEBUCK. NON-
TRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 158-61 (1977).
71. The positive theory needs to be tested by its performance in predicting cases and not by
the performance of one part of the theory in predicting some cases drawn from every corner of
takings law.
72. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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initially approved the project, subsequently demanded that there be
public access for other pleasure boat owners. The Court ruled against
the government, striking down the public-access ruling and leaving the
government empowered to open up the inlet only by condemning the
property and paying compensation. If, instead, the government had
made such a ruling about all marinas or all man-made inlets alofig a
given coast, for instance, then it is likely, I think, that the Court would
have allowed the regulation (pointing, perhaps, to the traditional power
over navigable waters), requiring only that the marinas and other facil-
ities built in these inlets not be regulated past the point where they
continue to earn a "fair" rate of return.
In A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. Fort Lauderdale,'7  a developer obtained
permits and began developing a wood chipping plant. Complaints from
neighbors (and, arguably, some violations of local rules) caused the city
to shut "Le Dump" down-but the court ruled that compensation was
required. The case might best be understood as suggesting that the de-
gree of an investor's reliance on earlier governmental permits or other
actions should be a variable in any positive theory, but, because there
are many cases in which similar reliance does not do the property
owner much good,74 it is more useful to focus on the fact that a single
developer was involved. A similar burden imposed on many developers
73. 850 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989).
74. Such a reliance-based theory has been suggested in the context of Kaiser Aetna. See L
TRIBE, supra note 2, at 601-02. But inasmuch as there are many cases in which investors' reliance
interests are destroyed and compensation is not forthcoming, it is not economical to build a posi-
tive theory of takings law around the idea that it is reliance interests that are generally protected.
Thus, when governments moved to rid highways and even towns of outdoor advertising
signs-which had been constructed, no doubt, in reliance on the proposition that such media
would continue to be unregulated---courts were divided as to whether compensation was constitu-
tionally required. For litigation on this subject within one circuit, compare Georgia Outdoor Ad-
vertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 690 F. Supp. 452 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (striking down statute
that required removal of all "off-premises" signs within four years (while signs found to have
average life of at least 27 years) and did not provide for compensation; plaintiff was committed to
leases beyond the four-year period and engaged in no other business) with Major Media v. City of
Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (court cites large number of cases io which very
short amortization, or transition, periods are legislated and finds five and one-half year amortiza-
tion period sufficient, where statute restricted previously approved billboards, but did not prohibit
all billboards nor entirely destroy plaintiff's business), affd, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987). The relevance of a reliance interest is apparent because there is no
reason to think (and certainly no case that suggests) that compensation would ever be available to
an owner whose property did not contain a billboard, but which dropped in value because a gov-
ernment's beautification scheme meant that no advertising space could be sold in the future. See,
e.g., Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 690 F. Supp. at 458 (suggesting that city could constitution-
ally "probably" prohibit construction of billboards in the future for aesthetic reasons).
It may be somewhat more useful to speculate that when a particular investor is specifically
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or factories (all of whom had permits) would most likely not have ex-
tracted such a ruling from any court. Indeed, there are many such reg-
ulations that shut down large numbers of facilities in the name of a
cleaner or safer environment, and it is regularly the case that no ex-
plicit compensation (through takings law) is available to owners who
are burdened by these governmental actions. 5
Finally, perhaps the most interesting of these cases is Ropico, Inc.
v. City of New York, 78 in which a bondholder objected to New York's
unilaterally declared moratorium on redeeming its bonds and reduc-
tions in the interest rates paid on these bonds. Note that there was not
a complete "physical taking"7 7 because the bonds could be sold to more
patient investors, or speculators. The value of these bonds had dropped,
but not to zero, because, although time is obviously money, the city did
not say that it would never abide by its original promises to the bond-
holders. The court declared that the city was permissibly using its
emergency powers in a time of financial crisis, with no compensation
required. The court may have believed that if the city were unable to
reduce payments in the way it had announced then it would completely
default-at which time bondholders would do even worse. Thus, it is
not unlikely that the moratorium and interest rate reduction plan were
in the bondholders' interests-and it is especially noteworthy that the
statutory moratorium mimicked a private bargain first struck with a
group of large institutional bondholders.7 8 Still, it may be especially
encouraged to rely on a government's position, as the plaintiff was in Kaiser Aetna, then compen-
sation may be more likely when the government's position changes to the detriment of that inves-
tor. A pre-Kaiser counterexample, however, is Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498
(1919) (city can require relocation of oil tanks for safety reasons even after it had earlier "re-
quested" their placement in current location near railway). Even if this version of the reliance
argument bears fruit, there will likely remain several explanations for judicial intervention in such
cases so that it is probably unprofitable to look for plaintiffs who simply relied on the status quo.
75. The classic case is Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), but because there is much
more to be said about this case than is warranted in the present article it is more useful to note
several others. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (no taking where Congress forbids
sale of artifacts made with eagle feathers, including artifacts made before passage of law); Rein-
man v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (no taking where further operation of livery
stables prohibited within certain parts of city); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) ("noxious
use" and no taking where plaintiff forced to shut down brewery because statute forbids sale and
manufacture of intoxicating beverages).
76. 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
77. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 79.
78. In Ropico, it is clear that no creditors were singled out. A set of large institutional inves-
tors had agreed that their notes would be subject to the moratorium proposed by the city and that
they would adjust the terms of the $1.7 billion of city bonds that they held, so that the statute
essentially required other investors, who, in the aggregate, had about the same amount at risk, to
[Vol. 22,285
HeinOnline  -- 22 Conn. L. Rev. 318 1989-1990
JUST COMPENSATION AND JUST POLITICS
noteworthy that there were many affected bondholders, including, no
doubt, some fairly powerful and politically sophisticated individuals
and corporations. I can not help but guess that if the city had dealt
with the crisis not by stopping payment to bondholders but, for in-
stance, by. declaring a moratorium on payments arising out of only one
large contract with one creditor, then somehow the court would have
been less agreeable and would have come to the rescue of this "unpro-
tected minority."
B. Politics as Part of a Comprehensive Takings Theory
The reader familiar with any of a number of areas of takings law
will know that there remains the need to explain why some burdens
involving organized interest groups do amount to compensable takings,
and why some that burden individuals do not yield compensation. The
most important set of cases in which members of organized interest
groups are compensated along with unprotected minorities are those in
which the government takes title to real property. If, for example, a
government should condemn all of the hotels in a city for the public
purpose of converting them to apartments for low-income residents, the
hotel owners will be compensated. 9 The fact that these property own-
ers are numerous or are already organized interferes not at all with the
prediction that this will be held to be a taking and that compensation
will be available if the government goes through with the plan. It is
simply the case that actual physical invasions, or takings of title, oc-
cupy a solid core in which the cases are predictable enough with no
theory at all. This is so even though it may seem odd at times that a
government that takes one square foot of land out of a huge estate
must pay compensation, while one that destroys three-quarters of the
value of a piece of property with regulations or with a noisy highway
nearby normally need pay nothing at all. This example of the availabil-
ity of compensation even when politics could be substituted for markets
(because some of these property owners, like the hotel owners in the
abide by similar rules. Ropico, 425 F. Supp. at 974-75. It is thus arguable that the injured credi-
tors were essentially represented by the well-organized interest group so that the statute imitated
the deal reached with organized unsophisticated interests.
79. See. e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (compensable taking where law, in order to
consolidate Native American land holdings, required very small interests in land to be
nondevisable and to pass to the state upon death of holder); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (taking where scheme required minor invasions of many build-
ings' rooftops).
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previous example, are already organized and hardly qualify as unpro-
tected minorities) does not undermine the search for unprotected mi-
norities as part of a larger theory of takings law-any more than it is a
problem for virtually any theory of takings law. Indeed, it is tempting
to insist that the existence of this core, or safe harbor for property own-
ers, supports the theory advanced here because physical takings (as op-
posed to regulatory or tax burdens) usually burden fewer people, who
will have relatively more trouble organizing into a political force. Often
the government takes property from just one or two property owners,
while regulatory burdens almost always affect larger numbers. And
even when there are many interests at stake, as when a proposed high-
way will run through hundreds of properties, the nonphysical burdens
of such a project are likely to fall on thousands of properties (such as
the homeowners who lose value because of noise from the new high-
way) whose owners can more easily organize than can the set of owners
whose properties are physically taken. In short, it is possible that the
rule of thumb, under which physical takings always yield compensa-
tion, is simply a convenient algorithm in the law, but it is at least argu-
able that it is a rule of thumb that is consistent with the view that
takings law is sensitive to unprotected minorities.
Nor is it troubling that the reliable core of cases in which compen-
sation is regularly required (even though the taking is from members of
organized interest groups) includes cases in which the government does
not quite physically take or invade but rather (strategically, in most
instances) regulates to such a degree that the property owner is left
with virtually nothing at all. 0 One might simply say that joined to the
core of physical takings are cases in which the government sought to
elevate form over substance in order to avoid compensating those bur-
dened by its actions. In any event, although it is arguable that the dis-
tinction between physical and regulatory takings supports the theoreti-
80. See, e.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938)
(residential rezoning found to deny plaintiff reasonable return where, in fact, no residential devel-
opment took place in eight subsequent years). For a catalogue and discussion of Arverne Bay
Construction and other cases in which Justice Holmes's dictum that "while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see W. STOEBUCK, supra note 70.
It goes without saying that such cases do not always yield compensation, but rather form part
of the murky middle in need of a positive theory. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (no compensation where new zoning scheme shuts down brickmaking operation located on
rich clay deposits such that value of property drops from $800,000 to $60,000). There are many
such cases, and I plan to include them in the more general positive theory of takings law promised
presently in the text.
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cal distinction between unprotected minorities and more organized
interest groups, it matters little, for our present purpose, why it is that
complete physical (or nearly so) takings always yield compensation,
while the chaos is contained in that area of law we label regulatory
takings. One might simply regard this as an historical accident or a
convenient rule of thumb linked to one version of the plainest meaning
of the language of the fifth amendment's takings clause.81 The real task
of any positive theory in takings law is, in short, not to explain physical
takings but to explain why some "less" invasive burdens rise to the
level of takings and others do not.
There are other cases in which even singly burdened citizens are
not compensated, and there are others in which compensation is availa-
ble to members of organized groups. But, as I have warned, it is not
possible in this article to take on all of takings law. I leave for another
day the development of additional analytic tools that may yield a more
complete positive theory of takings law. These other tools, or variables,
are not related to the idea of the importance of political coalitions, and
my goal in the present article has been to emphasize the interest and
the utility of thinking about the separation of markets and politics.
CONCLUSION
I have tried in this article to explore the interaction between, and
the separation of, markets and politics in the sense that the constitu-
tional requirement of just compensation injects a marketplace notion
into political decisionmaking. I have argued that the very reason why
we may not find more extensive use of market mechanisms, such as
explicit, or "special," bids, may suggest the starting ground of a new,
more successful, and more attractive theory of takings law.
It would be overly theoretical, however, to give the impression that
the inquiry into special bids and assessments was merely a necessary
step on the way to a positive theory of takings law. I think that the
pessimistic explanation of why we do not see special bids and other
explicit market influences on the political process is at least as convinc-
ing as the optimistic one that I drew on so heavily in Part III. If pessi-
mism is more appropriate, and if the exclusion of market mechanisms
from politics is in substantial part the product of the self-interest of
81. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 n.7 ("Early commentators viewed a physical occupation of
real property as the quintessential deprivation of property."). There is. unfortunately, little written
about early interpretations of the fifth amendment. See Sax, supra note 50. at 58 (contcmporane-
ous commentary in short supply).
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politicians, then it is especially important to explore the advantages and
disadvantages of innovations like special bids, and it is worthwhile to
think about ways in which such mechanisms could be introduced. And
even if one's reaction is somewhere in between the two extremes, as it
might be if the optimistic explanation-that politics is an efficient mar-
ket-seemed strong enough to explain why special bids had not yet ma-
terialized, but not so strong as to mean that special bids would not be a
worthwhile addition to the political arena, then it is appropriate to ex-
plore further the mechanics and implications of special bidding and to
advertise its possibilities in order to bring about some experimentation.
In the end, I think it likely that political bargaining, or logrolling,
plus special bids by interest groups (such as states that anticipate sub-
stantial positive spillovers from federal projects they covet) are likely to
yield better results than logrolling alone. Moreover, there are likely to
be desirable side effects from the special bidding process, such as the
possibility that because states (and other interest groups) will need to
think about the magnitude of their bids, politicians and citizens may
become far more involved than they presently are in thinking about the
advantages and disadvantages of government projects at every level.
While this is not yet another article extolling the virtues of communi-
tarianism or republicanism, it is surely the case that more explicit dis-
cussion about political bargains, interstate spillovers, and the means of
raising revenue for projects and for special bids would be a good thing
for our political life and for the quality of our self-government. How-
ever impressed I am that special bids have not evolved on their own,
and however impossible it seems to experiment intentionally with such
an intrusion of markets into politics, I can not help but believe that, if
the seed of the idea of special bids is dropped here and there, it might
flower into something that is both theoretically and practically
interesting.
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